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ARTICLES

ADVANCING TOLERANCE AND EQUALITY
USING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: ARE THE BOY
SCOUTSPREPARED?*

Rachel A. Van Cleave**
Fear leads to anger,
anger leads to hate, and
hate leads to suffering.
Yoda, in STAR WARS EPISODE I:
THE PHANToM MENACE (LUCASFILM LTD. 1999)

1. INTRODUCTION: INTOLERANCE AND

STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Intolerance remains a significant problem in the United States.
The recent shooting spree at a Jewish Community Center in Los
Angeles illustrates the persistent historical menace of religious
intolerance. 1 The violent murder of James Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Texas exemplifies racial intolerance even years after desegregation.2 In

*
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© Rachel A. Van Cleave, 1999. All rights reserved.

Associate Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. Stanford University, 1986; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1989; J.S.M.
Stanford Law School, 1994. I am indebted to Alison G. Myhra, Joseph Schottland, and
Linda S. Eckols for serving as sounding boards and for reviewing drafts, and to my
research assistants Jack W. Hill and Juan Carlos Rodriguez. I dedicate this paper to
Natasha Van Cleave-Schottland with the hope that she and her generation will see the
end of intolerance.
1. See Ed Vulliamy, US Nazis Find Their Latest Hero, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 15,
1999, at 20. In June of 1999 in Sacramento, California, three synagogues were the
targets of arson that caused over one million dollars in damage. See Preachers of Hate
Must Be Condemned, S.F. CHRON., July 10, 1999, at A20. Certainly, such intolerance
does not always result in violence. See, e.g., Gulfport, Mississippi: Family Suing School
After Its Board Banned 15-Year-Old Jewish Student from Wearing Star of David Necklace (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 19, 1999).
2. See Stephen F. Holder, Texas Man's Slaying Was a Hate Crime, NAACP Says,
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Laramie, Wyoming, Matthew Shepard's brutal murder highlights
the threat of violence prompted by sexual orientation intolerance. 3
The criminal justice system has responded to these types of hatemotivated crimes with punishment enhancements in the hopes of
deterring violent intolerance.4 Recognizing that hateful speech,
short of violence, can have harmful psychological effects particularlyon younger victims, many schools have adopted hate speech regulations to ensure that all students are able to "participate equally
in the learning process. »5 The above examples focus on the person
who has behaved violently or hatefully. In addition, there have
been attempts to ease the suffering of victims and their families

ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1999, at 9A (describing the death of an Mrican-American
man who "was dragged to death behind a pickup truck"); see also Taking on Hate
Crime, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 1999, at A20 [hereinafter Hate Crime].
3. See Bob Hohler, A Legacy of Friends and Tolerance; Death in Wyoming Stirs
Clinton Plea, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 1998, at Aa; Slain Wyoming Student Remembered
for a Trusting Nature, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1998, at A16. Earlier this summer, in
Redding, California, a shooting caused the death of two gay men in their shared home.
See Hate Crime, supra note 2. Often hate crimes involve more than one type of victim.
For example, the suspect charged in the shooting spree at the Jewish Community Center
confessed to killing a Filipino postal worker. See Vulliamy, supra note 1. Another example of such multiple hate crimes is the three-day shooting spree in Indiana and Illinois,
which targeted African-Americans, Jews, and Asians. See Hate in America: Four Notable
Cases, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 8, 1999, at 17A. For additional descriptions of
bias-motivated crimes, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE AsSISTANCE, A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO
HATE CRIMES 1-2, 14-15 (1997).
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1999);
TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.014 (West 1999); see also Bruce Tomaso, Gore Speaks

out for Stiffer Hate-Crime Law: VP Tells Urban League Conference Such Offenses "Fun_
damentally Different," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 10, 1999, at 15A (urging passage of
federal hate crimes law that passed the Senate but stalled in the House); Anti-Defamation League, 1999 Hate Crimes Laws (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.adl.orgl99hate
crime/text_Iegis.html> (proposing a model statute). Interestingly, only four months after
Matthew Shepard's murder, the Wyoming legislature failed to pass a hate crime law. See
Hate Crimes Legislation Is Defeated in Wyoming, HouS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1999, at A9.
5. Alison G. Myhra, The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68 N.D.
L. REv. 71, 74 (1992); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 439 (calling segregation a
"demeaning, caste-creating practice"). For additional discussions of campus speech codes,
see Thomas C. Grey, How to Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying: Reflections on
the Stanford Experience, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 891, 947-56 (1996) (setting out a "fundamental standard" as an alternative to a "speech code"). But see Elena Kagan, When a
Speech Code Is a Speech Code: The Stanford Policy and the Theory of Incidental Restraints, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 957, 957-58 (1996) (arguing that the "fundamental
standard" is in fact a speech code); John T. Shapiro, Note, The Call For Campus Conduct Policies: Censorship or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations on Speech, 75 MINN.
L. REv. 201, 205 (1990) (suggesting that anti-harassment policies could address the
problem of hate speech on campuses).
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and friends. After high school students in Maine drowned a gay
classmate, a teacher attempted to organize an all-day "Symposium
on Violence," at which representatives of various groups were to
speak on issues of tolerance with small groups of students. 6 Elton
John performed a benefit concert, which he dedicated to Matthew
Shepard, the victims at Columbine High School, and other victims
ofhate.7 Finally, some states have sought to teach tolerance.8
The above attempts to deter violent intolerance also seek to
ensure equality.9 Some people find difference threatening. lO Such
individuals might think, even unconsciously, "if the law protects the

6. See SoImitz v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 495 A.2d 812, 815, 818 (Me. 1985) (upholding the denial of an injunctive order that would have permitted the symposium to
be held after the Board of Directors of the School Administration District No. 59 voted
to cancel it). Ironically, an attempt to promote tolerance was thwarted by intolerance. In
Solmitz, it seems that the symposium was canceled because a homosexual would have
been a speaker along with other speakers and discussion leaders representing minority
groups. See id. at 815.
7. See Kevin McCullen, Elton John Sings Against Hate: Wyoming Concert Dedicated to Shepard, Columbine Victims, RocKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), June 2, 1999,
at 8A. For other examples of communities attempting to address forms of intolerance,
see Merle English, Healing Divisiveness with Prayer, Saint Martin de Porres, NEWSDAY,
June 1, 1999, at A5 (two thousand members of the Broad Channel community met for a
day of workshops and prayer after a float in a Labor Day parade portrayed, among
other things, the dragging death of a black man); Mary Evertz, Internet Quilters Piece
Together Memorial to Hate Crime Victim, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), June 29,
1999, at 6A (describing a quilt memorial to James Byrd, Jr.); Karen R. Long, Cleveland
Heights Athletes Promote Rally for Racial Harmony, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Aug. 12, 1999, at 15A (describing a "Walk Against Hate Parade" scheduled at the same
time as a Ku Klux Klan rally in downtown Cleveland).
8. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE AsSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 42-43 (describing education initiatives in South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey); Kelli Kristine
Armstrong, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs of Gay Youth
in Our Public Schools, 24 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 67, 85-92 (1994) (describing numerous programs designed to teach tolerance for sexual orientation differences); 66 HARv.
EDUC. REV. 173 (1996) (devoting the entire issue to the role of educators regarding the
issue of sexual orientation). Such educational efforts may require adding to Yoda's formula, "ignorance leads to fear."
9. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law,
106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997) (discussing the similarities between the struggle for equality
by religious groups and by homosexuals, as well as the current clash between the two
groups); Bobbi Bernstein, Note, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating
"Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REV. 269 (1995).
10. See Michael Kramer, Time to Fight Haters - We Don't Need to Be Victims of
Our Constitutional Rights, DAILY NEWS (New York, N.Y.), Aug. 15, 1999, at 43 ("People
hate difference, a reality that reflects learned behavior."); Rosemary N. Tomani, Anger
Spawns Hatred on the Road to Rage, BUFF. NEWS, June 6, 1999, at H2 (stating that the
violence involved in the Littleton shootings was caused by anger and hatred).
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rights of those who are different as it protects me, I might be adversely affected." For example, a common argument against samegender marriage is that it would have a negative effect on the heterosexual marriage, thus taking something away from oppositegender marriages. l1 It may be that this fear, however, which can
lead to hate and intolerance, can be overcome by individuals and
with small steps.12 That is, as people get to know individuals
whom they perceive as different, people will usually become at least
tolerant, perhaps less fearful and less angry, and maybe even accepting. 13 The question then becomes what role the law might
play, other than to punish the manifestations of hatred, to promote
tolerance when success may well depend upon individuals having
personal "contact experiences"14 with people whom such individuals perceive as different. Should the law be used to force such contact experiences? More concretely, should courts employ public
accommodation laws and constitutional protections of equality and
privacy in a way that might require intolerant people or organizations to include persons perceived as different? One concern with
using the law in this way is that people, or groups of people who
are consequently forced into relationships with individuals they
11. See Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity
Implications of Same· Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353, 355-56 (1999)
(identifying this argument and characterizing the tension as "[slame·gender marriage
[being] about people searching for integrated identities and others jealously and fearfully
guarding their own" (citing Richard D. Mohr, The Stakes in the Gay Marriage Wars, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 105, 106-07 (Robert M. Baird &
Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997»).
12. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2473 ("Equality comes on little cat's feet and not
in a single leap or bound.").
13. See, e.g., GoRDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJuDICE 278-81 (1954)
(proposing the "intergroup contact theory"). For application of this theory specifically to prejudice on the basis of sexual orientation, see Bernstein, supra note 9, at 271 (discussing
Gregory M. Herek & Eric K Glunt, Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexuals' Attitudes
Toward Gay Men: Results from a National Survey, 30 J. SEX RES. 239 (1993». Bernstein
also discusses a personal case study addressing this theory. See id. at 272-74; see also
Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, Some of My Best Friends: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996). Ideally, such experiences would result in acceptance, thus going beyond mere tolerance. See, e.g., Doris Y. Morrow, Letter to the Editor,
LUBBOCK AVALANCHE J., Aug. 18, 1999, at 7A (writer, responding to an editorial entitled
"Ban Gay Boy Scouts," discusses how she came to "love, appreciate and respect" gays
after learning of her son's homosexuality).
14. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 272 (discussing Herek & Glunt's three hypotheses). Bernstein also recounts examples of how members of Parents, Families and Friends
of Lesbian and Gays ("PFFLAG") changed their perspective on gays and lesbians after
learning that someone close to them was homosexual. See id. at 275.

1999]

Advancing Tolerance and Equality

241

perceive as different, may become even more angry and full of
hate. 15 Thus, a backlash could result, eliminating, or at least limiting, any initial advances in equality. On the other hand, the law's
approval or allowance of such exclusion may lead individuals in the
groups to conclude that they are justified in excluding those people
they perceive as different and perhaps even justified in their hatred
of people who are different.16
Two state courts recently confronted these types of issues in
the context of the Boy Scouts of America's (BSA) exclusion of homosexuals. 17 The supreme courts of New Jersey and California
reached opposite conclusions on the issue of whether the BSA may
exclude homosexuals from membership. IS Both cases involved the
statutory interpretation question of whether the Boy Scouts constitute a "business establishment" under the California statute,19 or a
"public accommodation" under the New Jersey statute.20 The New
Jersey court held that the BSA was subject to the state statute as a
public accommodation, and therefore could not exclude on the basis
of sexual orientation.21 The court further determined that subjecting BSA to the state anti-discrimination statute would not violate
its members' freedom of association rights under the United States
Constitution.22 By contrast, the California court held that the
Unruh Civil Rights Act did not apply to the BSA, finding that it is
not a business establishment, and thus the court did not address
15. See ALLpORT, supra note 13, at 469 (citing as a frequently voiced view that
"you cannot legislate against prejudice"). The legislative approach could "engender a
contempt for law and a disregard for it" first, because people are unlikely to comply
with such laws and second, because people consider such legislation to interfere too
much with their "right to hate whom they choose." [d. at 470.
16. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing the lower court
decision in the Kansas case, which, in discussing the negative effects of segregation
stated, "The impact is greater when [segregation] has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
[minority] group."); see also ALLPORT, supra note 13, at 469 (concluding that "we can be
entirely sure that discriminative laws increase prejudice"); Eskridge, supra note 9, at
2415 ("[I]n situations of direct clash [of rights] the state typically cannot remain neutral ...•").
17. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998); Dale v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
18. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218; Curran, 952 P.2d at 238.
19. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1999). This section is also known as the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. See id.
20. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1999). This section is also known as
the Law Against Discrimination. See id.
21. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218.
22. See id. at 1222.
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the constitutional issue.23
While neither opinion discussed issues of state constitutional
law, this Article examines the possibilities of using state constitutionallaw to promote tolerance in society. Such an inquiry is relevant because, unlike decisions by the United States Supreme Court,
decisions by state courts do not apply to the entire nation, thus
allowing state courts the opportunity "to face closer to home some
fundamental values that the public has become accustomed to
hav[ing] decided for them by the faraway oracles in the marble
temple."24 This aspect may begin to address the possibility that
tolerance can be advanced on smaller scales. Additionally, independent analysis of state constitutions by the state courts may serve as
laboratories for experimentation. 25 States might employ a variety
of approaches, perhaps moving away from the traditional dichotomies26 employed by the United States Supreme Court and provide
a fresh perspective on these issues. Furthermore, in terms of creating a theory of interpretation, the context involved in cases similar
to Dale and Curran allows courts to eschew typical independent
interpretations of state constitutions that place great reliance on

23. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 238. Other courts have also considered whether the
BSA falls within anti-discrimination statutes when the BSA denies membership to girls
or women. See, e.g., Yeaw v. Boy Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that the BSA is not a "business establishment" pursuant to the Unruh
Civil Rights Act), review dismissed, 960 P.2d 509 (Cal. 1998) (pending decision in
Curran); Quinnipac Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 528 A2d 352, 357 (Conn. 1987) (BSA is not subject to state public accommodation law). For an example when BSA has denied membership or promotion to
atheists, see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
the BSA is not a place of public accommodation for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 262 (Cal.
1998) (finding the BSA is not subject to state civil rights statute.); Seabourn v. Coronado
Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); see also Review & Outlook:
Scouts' Honor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1999, at W11 (labeling the above challenges as
attacks by "the Three G's: girls, gays and the godless").
24. Justice Hans A Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 395 (1980); see also Sanford Levinson, Freedom of
Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property Under State Constitutional Law, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 51, 59-63 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985).
25. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
26. See Martha Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1393, 1397 (1990) (suggesting "that we cannot assume that we know what to call things,
and point[ing] to the phrase 'hate speech,' as a name that already decides how to characterize, analyze, and treat the incidents" and further discussing the need to "dislodge
the basic assumption that analysis depends on a series of either/or choices, founded on
binary concepts" in the context of free speech claims).
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how the language of the state constitution differs from the federal
counterpart.27 The context of such cases allows courts to instead
examine a variety of sources focusing on how to combat bias and
prejudice as well as the particular problems confronting homosexuals, especially gay youths, who are the victims of intolerance.28
Among the issues of state constitutional law, this Article will
examine the rights of privacy, freedom of association, equal protection, as well as the requirement of state action in the context of
cases like Dale and Curran. In addition, the Author suggests possible methods for reconciling rights that conflict as a result of independent state constitutional interpretation. Part II discusses the
Dale and Curran cases.29 Next, Part III summarizes current analysis of these constitutional issues by the United States Supreme
COurt,30 and examines the extent to which state courts have employed independent interpretations of their constitutions.3 ! Finally,
Part IV discusses a variety of sources relevant to the conflict of
rights involved and urges courts to look to such sources as part of
their independent analysis in an effort to eschew the traditional
dichotomies.32

27. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (listing seven criteria the court should use in applying a state constitution to
protect individual rights). Most of these factors require a finding of a unique aspect of
the state constitution, such as its text or history, or of the state itself, such as its
traditions or matters of particular local concern. See id. But see Robert A. Schapiro,
Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389 (1998)
(questioning the value of searching for a distinct state identity).
28. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARv. L. REv. 1147, 1160 (1993) (criticizing the "doctrine of unique state sources" and
urging state courts to consider instead "the widest possible [range of] sources" to promote national constitutional discourse). This approach is perhaps analogous to that used
by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, in which the
Court did not limit itself to the "tangible factors" tending to show equalization of white
and black schools, and instead considered "the effect of segregation itself on public
education." 347 U.S. at 492.
29. See infra Part II.
30. The reader might ask, why discuss the Federal Constitution in an article on
state constitutional law? The area of state constitutional law is essentially a type of
comparative law study, involving comparisons between state and federal jurisprudence,
as well as comparisons among state interpretations. For this reason, analysis of federal
interpretation is necessary to illustrate the extent to which state interpretation is independent.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE DALE AND CURRAN CASES
Dale and Curran contained similar facts. Both involved plaintiffs who had participated in the Boy Scouts for a significant period
of time (Dale for ten years and Curran for four years), both plaintiffs had received numerous awards and honors as scouts, and both
declared their homosexuality outside of any Boy Scouts function or
context.33 BSA, however, had accepted Dale's application to be an
Assistant Scoutmaster before he had declared his homosexuality,
while Curran had applied to attend a BSA National Jamboree after
he was featured in a newspaper series on gay teenagers.34 Dale's
membership was revoked, and Curran's application was denied. 35
Both plaintiffs alleged that BSA violated state statutory discrimination laws, thus both courts had to determine whether such statutes
applied to BSA.36 Finally, the anti-discrimination statutes in both
states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.37
In Dale, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the policy
behind the Law Against Discrimination as well as a legislative
mandate to interpret the statute broadly to determine that the law
applied to the BSA.38 The statute itself states that "[d]iscrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the state but menaces the institutions and foundation
of a free democratic State."39 In addition, the statute specifically
states that it is to be "liberally construed. "40 Against this statutory

33. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 220; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05.
34. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 221; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204.
35. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 221; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05. The facts in Curran
on this point are a little more complicated. After Curran had been featured in a newspaper article on gay teenagers, the Executive Director of the Mt. Diablo Council determined that Curran was no longer active in the program. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 221.
Later, Curran submitted his application to attend the Jamboree and was told that he
was no longer registered as an active member and was therefore ineligible to attend. See
id. When Curran stated that he would apply to be an active adult member, the director
told him that BSA would not be able to accept such an application from him. See id.
36. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 222; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205.
37. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (protecting against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation by judicial fiat); N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-4 ("All persons shall have the
opportunity . . . to obtain all the accommodations . . . without discrimination because
of ... affectional or sexual orientation . . . ."). See, e.g., In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 999
(Cal. 1970) (concluding that a business owner may not arbitrarily exclude); Stoumen v.
Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1951) (in dictum) (finding a restaurant owner may not
exclude homosexuals without showing good cause).
38. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208.
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3.
40.Id.
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backdrop, as well as case law precedent, the court interpreted the
term "place of accommodation" in a way that did not require an
organization to have a fixed structural facility.41 The court also
held that the BSA is a place of "public accommodation" based on
the following factors: BSA engages in broad public solicitation for
members, it maintains close relationships with the government and
other public accommodations, and it is similar to other recognized
public accommodations.42
Since the court held that the public accommodation statute
applied to the BSA, it had to address the constitutional defense
raised by the BSA.43 The BSA argued that the First Amendment
freedom of association protected its members from application of
the Law Against Discrimination.44 The court relied on United
States Supreme Court precedent in its analysis of the two strands
of associational rights.45 First is the "intimate association" strand,
which stems from the Court's rulings in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees 46 and Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte. 47 The Jaycees and Rotary International, both private clubs, denied regular membership to women. 48 The clubs challenged state public accommodation laws forcing them to admit
women, and argued that such application would violate the other
members' First Amendment freedom of association right.49 The
United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of relationships that "involve deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life."50 Thus, the Court focused on factors such as smallness, selectivity, and seclusion from
others as the attributes that "reflect the considerations that have
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic

41. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1210. But see Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (holding that Congress did not intend 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) "to include membership organizations that do
not maintain a close connection to a structural facility").
42. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1210-13.
43. See id. at 1219.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
47. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
48. See Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 541; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
49. See Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 543; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616-17.
50. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20.
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element of personalliberty."51 In both Roberts and Rotary International, the Court concluded that neither club satisfied the factors to
show that the relationships among its members were "the kind of
intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection."52 The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts
were comparable to the Jaycees and Rotary International. 53 Since
troop sizes vary from fifteen to thirty boys plus adult members, the
court held that the smallness factor was not present.54 As to selectivity, the court found that "any boy between the ages of eleven and
seventeen can join," and similar to the facts in Rotary International, the BSA "actively [sought] to interest as many boys as possible. "55 In addition, the court focused on the Boy Scouts' "commitment to ensur[ing] that its membership is 'representative of all of
the population.,"56 The court concluded that the nature of the relationship involved in a troop is not the type of intimate and private
relationship which the First Amendment protects. 57
As to the second strand of freedom of association, the court
analyzed whether forcing the Boy Scouts not to discriminate in
their membership on the basis of sexual orientation would infringe
on "expressive association" rights. 58 The court looked to United
States Supreme Court precedent that has explained that the Constitution protects expressive association to allow individuals to
combine their efforts to pursue other rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.59 The Court also stated that while "[fJreedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate[60] . . .
[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however,
absolute."61 Rather, the Supreme Court, in both Roberts and Rotary International, critically examined the expressive purpose asserted by the clubs. 62 In Roberts, the Court rejected the argument that

51. [d. at 620.
52. Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 546; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
53. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1220-21.
54. See id. at 1221.
55. [d.
56. [d. at 1222.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1222-28 (discussing "expressive association" rights).
59. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1222 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
60. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977».
61. [d.

62. Rotary [nt'l, 481 U.S. at 548-49 (discussing the purpose of Rotary Clubs);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23 (discussing the purpose of BSA).
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forcing the Jaycees to grant women regular membership would
alter or affect any speech based on the mere fact that under membership rules women are not allowed to vote.S3
Similarly in Dale, the court critically examined the expressive
association asserted by the Boy Scouts.64 The Boy Scouts claimed
that its Law and Oath express its members' views on homosexuality.65 They pointed to the fact that the Boy Scout Law requires members to be "clean."66 In addition, in the Boy Scout Oath each scout
promises to "keep ... morally straight. »67 The court concluded that
these words "do not, on their face, express anything about sexuality, much less that homosexuality, in particular, is immoral."66 In
fact, in its discussion of the facts of the case, the court pointed out
that the Scoutmaster Handbook instructs the leaders to refrain
from discussing sex at all, stating that "boys should learn about sex
and family life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual
beliefs."69 The New Jersey court concluded that "Boy Scout members do not associate to share the view that homosexuality is immoral," and therefore "Dale's expulsion constituted discrimination
based solely on his status as an openly gay man. "70 In addition,
the court distinguished the facts involved in Dale from those in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group.71 In
Hurley, the United States Supreme Court held that forcing private
parade organizers to include a contingency of gay, lesbian and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants would "essentially requir[e]
[the organizers] to alter the expressive content of their parade."72
Notably, the Supreme Court was less scrutinizing of any message of

63. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. However, Justice O'Connor suggested an alternative method of analysis in her concurring opinion. She asserted that state regulations be
subject to rationality review when the organization affected is a commercial association.
See id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, associations should be treated as
commercial if its activities are not "predominantly of the type protected by the First
Amendment." [d. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1222-28.
65. See id. at 1223.
66. Id. at 1224. It also requires them to be "trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly,
courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, . . . and reverent." Id. at 1223.
67. Id. at 1202. The entire Oath is: "I will do my best to do my duty to God and
my country and to obey the Scout Law; to help other people at all times; to keep myself
physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." Id.
68. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1224.
69. Id. at 1203 (quoting the Boy Scout Handbook).
70. [d. at 1225.
71. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
72. Id. at 572-73.
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the parade than it had been of the asserted expressive association
asserted by the private clubs in Roberts and Rotary International. 73 In fact, the state court, in Hurley, had found "that it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose in the parade. "74 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that the very nature of a parade indicates that the marchers "are making some sort of collective point,
not just to each other but to bystanders along the way."76 By contrast, the BSA could not show that membership or leadership in the
BSA constitutes "a form of 'pure speech' akin to a parade."76 Thus,
the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the distinction in Hurley
that the nature of the conduct of the group was in fact expressive,
while the same could not be said of the BSA or leadership in the
BSA77
The California Supreme Court in Curran held that the BSA is
not subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act/8 which applies to "all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever."79 In contrast to
the statutory analysis by the New Jersey court, the Curran court
employed an unclear and somewhat tortuous consideration of the
statute's meaning.50 The California court examined the legislative
amendments to the statute in an attempt to establish the legislative intent.51 As originally enacted, the law applied to "places of
public accommodation or amusement" and listed ten specific examples. 52 In 1959, however, the legislature changed the statute to its
current language. The court explained that this amendment was in
73. See id. at 568-72 (discussing the First Amendment protection given to the
message, or "collective point," that is made by a parade). But cf. Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S.
at 545-47 (holding that the club's "association" did not warrant constitutional protection);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-29 (noting acceptable limitations on a groups' rights to expressive association when there is a "legitimate" state purpose at issue).
74. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 564 (discussing the fmdings and conclusions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts).
75. Id. at 568.
76. Dale, 734 A2d at 1229.
77. See id.
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.
79. Id.
80. See generally Curran, 952 P.2d 218. In a concurring opinion, Justice Mosk indicates that the majority's analysis is flawed. See id. at 252 ("The m(\jority, however, do
not engage in identical analysis [to Mosk's] - or, despite their many pages, in any
substantial analysis as an alternative."). Mosk agreed with the result - Unruh does not
apply to the BSA - but urged the court to overrule Isbister u. Boys' Club of Santa
Cruz, 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985), and articulate a clear standard for the term "business
establishment." See id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
81. See id.
82. See id.
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response to appellate court opinions that held that the statute did
not apply to a private cemetery, a dentist's office and to a private
school.83 Further, the court stated that the legislature "undertook ... to revise and expand the scope of the then-existing version
of section 51."84 Despite acknowledgment of the legislative goal to
broaden the application of Unruh, the court in Curran concluded
that the Act does not apply to the BSA.85 The court struggled to
distinguish the Boy Scouts from the Boys' Club, to which the court
had applied the Unruh Civil Rights Act.86 In Isbister v. Boys' Club
of Santa Cruz,87 the California Supreme Court relied on the
legislature's intent to expand the scope of Unruh to hold that the
Act applied to the membership policies of a charitable organization
"if the entity's attributes and activities demonstrate that it is the
functional equivalent of a classic 'place[] of public accommodation or
amusement.,"8S Thus the court in Isbister essentially relied on the
statutory language of Unruh before its amendment in 1959.89 The
majority in Curran endorsed this legislative intent analysis, but
concluded that the Boy Scouts differ from the Boys' Club.90 Interestingly, the court did not consider relevant to its legislative intent
analysis the fact that attempts by some legislators to specifically
exempt the Boy Scouts from the Unruh Act failed passage in committee,91 even though such attempts were in direct response to the

83. See id. (citing Reed v. Hollywood Prof! School, 338 P.2d 633 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959); Coleman v. Middlestaft', 305 P.2d 1020 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Long v. Mountain
View Cemetery Ass'n, 278 P.2d 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955».
84. Curran, 952 P.2d at 229
85. See id. at 239.
86. See id. at 232-33 (emphasizing the narrow scope of the Isbister holding). Justice Mosk also criticizes the majority for doing "little more than attempt[ing] to distinguish Isbister." Id. at 252 (Mosk, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
87. 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
88. Curran, 952 P.2d at 236 (quoting Isbister, 707 P.2d at 216 (alteration in
original).
89. See id. at 249-50 (Mosk, J., concurring) (criticizing the Isbister majority for
applying language in the original version of the Unruh Act rather than the current
version).
90. See id. at 238.
91. S~e id. at 228 n.12 ("[T]he Legislature's failure to enact the proposed bills . . .
cannot properly be viewed as a legislative resolution of the issue now before us."). In
addition, a further attempt to exempt the Boy Scouts was made after the California
Supreme Court's decision; this too failed in committee. See S.B. 1910, 1997-98 Reg. Sess.
(Cal.) The proposed amendment stated "'business establishment' . . . does not include
any voluntary association or not-for-profit organization if the primary activities of the
association or organization are programs for minors." Id. These exempt associations and
organizations include, but are not limited to, the Boy Scouts of America. See id.
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decision from the lower COurt.92
The court also justified its holding on the grounds that the BSA
is a "charitable, expressive, and social organization . . . whose formation and activities are unrelated to the promotion or advancement of the economic or business interests of its members. "93
Since the Boys' Club is also non-profit and a social organization, the
expressive nature of the Boy Scouts seemed to be of greater significance to the COurt.94 In fact, the court elaborates on the "expressive" aspect of the Boy Scouts based on the court's conclusion that
its "primary function is the inculcation of values in its youth members."95 The court's reliance on the BSA's expressive aspect is very
similar to the analysis used to determine whether subjecting the
entity to the statute would violate the First Amendment protection
of freedom of association. 96 Thus, the court seemed to consider the
first amendment defense within the question of whether the BSA
constitutes a business establishment, and relied on any expressive
aspect to support the holding that the BSA is not a business establishment. 97
The methods of analysis used by the courts in both Curran and
Dale reflect the traditional public/private dichotomy involved in the
interpretation of public accommodation statutes regarding their
scope as well as in the context of evaluating the constitutional defense of freedom of association. 9s The following section summarizes
the traditional analyses in the context of several constitutional
issues and suggests how state courts might employ their own constitutions to develop new theories of interpretation that break away
from the bin~9 method of analysis.
92. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that Curran had stated a cause of action under Unruh), affd, 952 P.2d 218
(Cal. 1998).
93. Curran, 952 P.2d at 236.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 238.
96. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
97. In fact, concurring Justice Kennard focused on this constitutional question so as
to avoid any detailed analysis of the application of the statute. See Curran, 952 P.2d at
254-56 (Kennard, J., concurring).
98. See generally Curran, 952 P.2d 218 (interpreting the Unruh Civil Rights Act to
find that BSA is not a "business establishment" under the Act). But cf. Dale, 734 A.2d
1196 (interpreting New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination to find that BSA is a "place
of public accommodation"}.
99. See Minow, supra note 26, at 1397; Myhra, supra note 5, at 79-80 & n.39
(arguing that an "expansive view of the people who potentially may suffer iDjury [from
hateful speech is] indispensable in considering how to respond to hate incidents").
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Ill. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES
Both California and New Jersey have well developed histories
of interpreting and applying their state constitutions independently
of United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution. lOo Nonetheless, neither the Curran nor Dale courts discussed state constitutional law issues. 10l There may be several
reasons for this. The parties may not have raised state constitutional law issues;lo2 perhaps because both states have anti-discrimination statutory provisions that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. loa The lawyers representing Dale and
Curran may have decided that it was unnecessary to raise an equal
protection claim. As to the constitutional defense of freedom of
association raised by the BSA,104 the lawyers may have thought
that the precedent of the United States Supreme Court adequately
protected their rights and that the New Jersey Constitution would
not have provided any greater protections. In addition, when a
state court relies on its state constitution, the court often, but certainly not always,105 interprets the document in a way that is
more protective of rights. Since the New Jersey court found that application of its Law Against Discrimination did not violate the
rights of the BSA, it limited its analysis to the federal Constitution;
100. See generally Wesley L. Lanee, Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the New
Jersey Constitution, The 1947 Constitution: A Retrospective, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
817 (1997); Stewart G. Pollock, Celebrating Fifty Years of Judicial Reform Under the
1947 New Jersey Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 6735 (1998); California Constitutional
Symposium, 17 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1989); Jeffrey White, Note, State Constitutional
Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737, 740 (1976) (describing the California Supreme Court
as "the birthplace of th[e] new judicial independence").
101. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 219. Though the court never reached the constitutional
issues, they questioned whether application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act would violate
BSA's rights "under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution."
[d. (emphasis added). The Dale court also framed the issue around BSA's First Amendment rights under the federal constitution. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1200.
102. See State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring) (warning that "[a]ny defense lawyer who fails to raise an Oregon Constitution violation and
relies solely on parallel provisions under the federal constitution . . . should be guilty of
legal malpractice," yet criticizing the majority opinion's reliance on the state constitution
to reject United States Supreme Court's precedent); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV. 199, 224 (1998) (explaining the
importance of raising state constitutional claims).
103. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -49.
104. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219-28.
105. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 725 P.2d 894, 895 (Or. 1986) (holding that the Oregon
Constitution does not require Miranda-type warnings).
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the court was not looking to broaden rights, and thus an analysis of
the state constitution was not necessary. lOG This section briefly explains the jurisprudence of constitutional issues involved under
both state and federal constitutions.
A. Equal Protection
There are several methods of analysis by which courts may
extend equal protection rights to homosexuals. 107 The main avenues are for a court to determine that homosexuals are a "suspect
class" or that a fundamental right is at stake. lOS Under either type
of analysis, the court then subjects the law or form of discrimination to strict scrutiny.109 "Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal
to the challenged law."110 Alternatively, a court would simply examine the statute applying a rational basis test to any non-suspect
classification. 111 In contrast to the typical result when the court
applies strict scrutiny, "[t]he rational basis test is enormously deferential to the government and only rarely have laws been declared
unconstitutional [under] this level of review."1l2 The following examples reflect each of these approaches.
The United States Supreme Court recently found protection
against unequal treatment for homosexuals in a limited context. In
Romer v. Evans,1l3 the Court found that a voter-initiated
amendment to the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2), which
repealed state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, was unconstitutional. 1l4 The Court's finding that the
106. See Van Cleave, supra note 102, at 209-14 (discussing certain methods of state
constitutional interpretation that are susceptible to the criticism of being "result·orient·
ed").
107. For a more detailed discussion of equality for homosexuals, see Eskridge, supra
note 9; Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989).
108. See Halley, supra note 107, at 920-21 (discussing treating homosexuals as a
"suspect class"); see also Bernstein, supra note 9, at 269 (noting the strengths and
weaknesses of "suspect class" and fundamental right arguments).
109. See generally Bernstein, supra note 9, at 269. Because courts have generally
rejected the "suspect class" analysis with respect to sexual orientation, Bernstein argues
that claiming denial of a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection clause would
provide the same heightened judicial scrutiny. See id.
110. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 529
(1997).
111. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 293.
112. CHElI1ERINSKY, supra note 110, at 530.
113. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
114. See id. at 636.
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amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not based on a determination that homosexuals
constitute a suspect class, U5 but on the grounds that Amendment
2 imposed a "disability on a single named group" and lacked a "rational relationship to legitimate state interests."U6 Thus, the
Court applied a rational basis test and found that Amendment 2
failed. u7 While the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately reached
the same result, it did so by holding that the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process required application of
strict scrutiny. us Of course, the Colorado court considered only
the Federal Constitution because Amendment 2 was itself part of
the state constitution. ll9 Neither approach taken by the Colorado
and United States Supreme Courts involved treating homosexuals
as a suspect class. Justice Brennan, however, has written that
"homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this
country's population."120 In his opinion dissenting from a denial of

115. One commentator has argued that gay rights might be better furthered in
federal courts if equal protection claims are based on fundamental rights rather than
suspect classification in order to "suppl[y] the courts with a route to heightened scrutiny." Bernstein, supra note 9, at 293.
116. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
117. See id. This approach is in contrast to that used by the Court 10 years earlier
in Bowers v. Hardwiek, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the Court upheld a criminal sodomy
law. In Bowers, the Court applied a Due Process analysis and found that no fundamental liberty was involved because a right to engage in consensual sodomy is not "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," nor is it "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937), and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977»; see also Janet E. Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L.
REv. 1721, 1745-47 (1993) (examining the conduct/status dichotomy); Kendall Thomas,
The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV.
1805 (1993).
118. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993), affd, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
119. Typically, states that employ the voter initiative method of constitutional
change have rather narrow bases for invalidating such amendments. For example, in
California, a court may invalidate a voter-initiated constitutional change if the amendment encompasses more than a "single subject" or if it constitutes a constitutional
revision rather than an amendment. See Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 129-30 (1993). The California Supreme Court has applied
both of these limitations sparingly, invalidating few voter-initiated constitutional changes.
See id.
120. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Watkins v. United States Army, 875
F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "because homosexuals have historically been
subject to invidious discrimination, laws which burden homosexuals as a class should be
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certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,121 Justice Brennan pointed to the fact that "the immediate and severe
opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals ... [makes]
members of this group particularly powerless to pursue their rights
openly in the political arena."122 This analysis, however, has not
yet been adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Both the
Supreme Court and Brennan focus on the either/or question of
whether homosexuals constitute a protected or suspect class, and
neither address the question of when the state may and may not
treat certain groups of individuals differently from other
groups. 123
State courts have also fallen prey to this dichotomous reasoning. In interpreting their own constitutions, state courts have held
that equal protection provisions extend to homosexuals, albeit in a
sometimes circuitous fashion. For example, in Baehr v. Lewin,124
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that sex is a "suspect category"
under the Hawaii Constitution, based on the fact that the state
constitution, in contrast to the Federal Constitution, expressly includes "sex" in its equal rights provision. l25 The court thus held
that the state marriage statute, which limited the granting of marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples, must be subjected to strict
scrutiny.126 Although in Baehr the classification was subject to
strict scrutiny, the discrimination was based on "sex" rather than
sexual orientation,127 thus somewhat limiting the potential for relying on this case in other contexts relating to equal protection
rights for homosexuals. By contrast, in Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 128 the California Supreme
Court reaffirmed that its state equal protection provision protects

subjected to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause" and thus distinguishing the court's Equal Protection analysis from the Due Process analysis used in Bowers).
121. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
122. Id. at 1014.
123. See id. at 1009.
124. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
125. See id. at 60, 67. The court, however, expressly stated that its "holding in this
regard is not ... [t]hat Appellants are a suspect class." Id. at 67 n.33 (distinguishing
its opinion from the dissent). Nonetheless, the opinion represents greater protection for
homosexuals than afforded under the federal Constitution.
126. See id. at 67. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintifl's
complaint and remanded. See id. at 68. For a description of subsequent proceedings, see
Eckols, supra note 11, at 387-88.
127. See Baeher, 852 P.2d at 60.
128. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
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against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 129 Application of strict scrutiny, however, depends on a finding of a suspect
classification. In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,13o the court held that a denial of dental benefits to unmarried partners of homosexual state employees did not establish any
classification and thus did not violate the equal protection clause of
the California Constitution. 13l Therefore, in California, while the
state equal protection clause protects against discrimination on the
. basis of sexual orientation, such discrimination is not subject to
strict scrutiny, but rather a less demanding form of review, unless
there is a specific classification singling out homosexuals.132
State courts have an opportunity to examine whether their
constitutions protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Similar to the analysis used by Justice Brennan in
Rowland, state courts might be able to point to the fact that in
1997, 13.94% of bias-motivated offenses were based on the victim's
sexual orientation. l33 This statistic would imply that homosexuals
are an "insular minority" requiring state constitutional protection.
While the federal courts might be hostile to such arguments,134
state courts might be more receptive. Aside from looking to statistics and other sources, a state court might rely on the language of
its state constitution as a basis for concluding that homosexuals
constitute an "insular minority." For example, in Commonwealth v.
Wasson/ 35 the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down a criminal
sodomy law in part because the law violated the state constitution's
equal protection provision. 13s The court relied on the more expan-

129. See id. at 597 ("[T]his general constitutional principle [that the state equal
protection clause forbids the state from "arbitrarily discriminating against any class of
individuals in employment decisions"] applies to homosexuals as well as to all other
members of our polity.").
130. 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
131. See id. at 416.
132. Cf. Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112, 126-27 (Mont. 1997) (Turnage, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that rather than strike the criminal sodomy law on the grounds
that it violates the right to privacy, the court should have relied on equal protection
analysis and found that the classification had no rational basis, even though the statute
specifically singled out sexual intercourse between two persons of the same sex).
133. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME
REpORTS 60-61 (1997).
134. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 278; Thomas B. Stoddard, Lesbian and Gay
Rights Litigation Before a Hostile Federal Judiciary: Extracting Benefit from Peril, 27
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 555, 558 (1992).
135. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
136. See id. at 500.
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sive language of the state provision,137 as compared to the federal
counterpart, 138 and concluded that "[a]ll are entitled to equal
treatment, unless there is a substantial governmental interest, a
rational basis, for different treatment."139 The court went on to
critically examine the justifications for the separate classification
and rejected them as "simply outrageous."140 Thus, although the
court employed language indicating that it was using a rational
basis test,141 it actually scrutinized the governmental purpose
carefully. In Wasson, the court appeared to be less concerned with
the traditional dichotomy of whether or not a suspect class was
before them, than with the legitimacy of the governmental interests
used to justify treating anyone differently. The Wasson court's discussion of the right to privacy, discussed below, represents an even
better example of moving away from either/or questions and how to
consider a variety of sources.
B. Privacy

Another avenue for advancing homosexual rights has been
reliance on a right of privacy in order to defeat state laws
criminalizing sodomy.142 In Bowers v. Hardwick/ 43 the Supreme
Court did not discuss a right to privacy, but folded this claim into
its discussion of the due process argument. 144 Like the United

137. "All men, when they form a social compact, are equal," and "absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of free men exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority." Ky. CONST. §§ 2-3; see also John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights
Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 839-41 (1990) (discussing state equality provisions in the context of analyzing whether state action is
required under state constitutions). See generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195 (1985) (discussing the variety of
language used in state constitutions to secure equality).
138. "[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500.
140. Id. at 501.
141. See id. at 500.
142. For further discussion of this issue, see Ron Buckmire, Narrative and Jurisprudence in State Courts: The Example of Constitutional Challenges to Sex Conduct Regulation, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1633 (1997); Nan Feyler, The Use of the State Constitutional Right
to Privacy to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 973 (1986).
143. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
144. See id. at 191-92. In contrast to the mltiority's focus on whether there is a
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the dissent stated that the real issue in the case
is about "the right to be let alone." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
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States Constitution, the Kentucky Constitution does not contain an
express right of privacy. Nonetheless, the court in Wasson determined that the state constitution protects such a right.145 In support of its conclusion, the court relied in part on a theory typical of
independent interpretation. 146 The court looked to the history of
the Kentucky Constitution, as well as to the text of the constitution, which differed from the United States Constitution, to support
a right of privacy violated by the state sodomy law violated. 147
The court employed another of Justice Handler's criterion in examining the debates surrounding the Kentucky Constitution to find
that it "express[es] protection of individual liberties significantly
greater than the selective list of rights addressed by the Federal
Bill of Rights."148 The court, however, supplemented this traditional method of state constitutional analysis with citations to nonlegal sources such as John Stuart Mill, a nineteenth century economist and philosopher.149 In fact, Wasson is cited by commentator
Kahn as an example of a state court relying on more than simply
the uniqueness of the state or the state constitution. 150
Aside from analysis of the right of privacy in the specific context of litigation/51 this Article queries whether it might be possible for state courts to consider other aspects of privacy impacted by
allowing the Boy Scouts to exclude individuals on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, masked by the legal facts set out in the
opinion of Bowers, is the story told by Michael Hardwick in which
he recounts the events leading up to his arrest for violation of the

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting».
145. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 492.
146. See id. at 492-99.
147. See id.
148. [d. at 494.
149. See id. at 496 (citing Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386 (Ky. 1909)
(quoting at length John Stuart Mill's ON LIBERTY».
150. See Kahn, supra note 28, at 1153 n.25.
151. Other examples of state courts relying on their state constitution to overturn
sodomy laws include Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121-22 (Mont. 1997) (relying on an
express provision protecting the right to privacy in Declaration of Rights in Montana's
constitution to subject the statute to strict scrutiny) and Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250, 260-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the Homosexual Practices Act unconstitutional based on state's constitution). The right of privacy also arose in the context of
same-gender marriage. The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the argument using an analysis similar to the United States Supreme Court in Bowers: The right to a same-sex
marriage is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57; see
also Eckols, supra note 11, at 383-93 (describing considerations of the right to privacy
and same-gender marriage by other state courts).
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sodomy law, and reveals a specific effort by the officer involved162
to "search out and expose homosexuals."163 Similarly, the facts in
Wasson illustrate how the mere existence of the law against sodomy
prompted the police to orchestrate an undercover operation164 for
the purpose of "lur[ing] homosexuals into violations of law."165 In
addition to how this reflects on law enforcement and allocation of
resources,156 this type of activity also raises concerns about the
pursuit of individuals based on sexual orientation, which is very
similar to the witch hunts that have followed the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy regarding homosexuals. 157
The Web site for Servicemembers Legal Defense Network
(SLDN) documents numerous invasions of privacy in furtherance of
an attempt to ferret out homosexuals in the military.15B In addition to invasions of privacy, service members who have complained
about harassment they have suffered have themselves been the
focus of investigations. 159 Rather than "live[] in constant fear of
being 'found out'" many qualified service members have resigned. l60

152. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEm CONVICTIONS 392-97 (1988).
153. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2425 (describing efforts by state and federal governments in the 1950s to regulate homosexual activity and referring to Bowers as the last
in line of court decisions criminalizing defendants for their deviant sexual activity).
154. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 488.
155. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2425.
156. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Ouercriminalization, 374 THE ANNALS 157
(1967), reprinted in THE CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 165
(Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 6th ed. 1995) ("To obtain evidence, [of
consensual homosexual conduct] police are obliged to resort to behavior which tends to
degrade and demean both themselves personally and law enforcement as an institution."); see also Bielicki v. Superior Court, 371 P.2d 288, 289 (Cal. 1962) (describing how
a police officer used a pipe running through the ceiling to observe homosexual conduct
inside a fully-enclosed stall of a pay toilet).
157. See Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, Conduct Unbecoming: The Fifth
Annual Report on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" (Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.
sldn.orglreportslfifthl> [hereinafter Conduct Unbecoming].
158. See Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, The Sole National Legal Aid and
Watchdog Organization That Assists Seroicemembers Hurt By the Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
Don't Pursue Policy (last modified Aug. 31, 1999) <http://www.sldn.org> (describing, for
example, how a Navy psychiatrist turned in a corporeal after he asked a question about
homosexuality, and how a Cadet's diary and three years worth of e-mail messages were
seized to support allegations that she was a lesbian).
159. See id. (noting that a private was accused of being a lesbian after reporting
that she was nearly raped).
160. Jill Szymanski, A Disseroice to Those Seroing Honorably, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRm., Mar. 19, 1999, at B-ll. In 1998, 414 people were dismissed from the Air Force
due to their homosexuality. See Air Force Witch Hunt, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 4,
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based on equal protection or right of privacy grounds. State action
involves "the essential dichotomy . . . between deprivation by the
State, subject to [constitutional] scrutiny under its provisions, and
private conduct... against which the Fourteenth Amendment
offers no shield."165 Thus, the binary of private action/state action
is entrenched in the traditional analysis of the state action requirement. A number of state courts have determined that their state
constitutions do not require the analysis used by the United States
Supreme Court and have thus applied state constitutional provisions to entities that the United States Supreme Court would exempt. 166 The principal methods used by state courts are those
listed in Justice Handler's opinion in State v. Hunt. 167 For example, in finding that the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution applied to the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (PT&T), the California Supreme Court relied on the textual
differences between the state provision and the parallel federal
provision. 166 Specifically, the court concluded that the California
Constitution "contains no such explicit 'state action' requirement."169 Despite the lack of an express state action requirement,
the court fell into the trap of binary analysis and simply expanded
the definition of state action. 170 The court concluded that the state
equal protection provision applied to PT&T based on the company's
status as "a privately owned public utility, which enjoys a state-protected monopoly or quasi-monopoly."171 In a later case, the California Supreme Court, employing the same dichotomy, determined
that the state constitutional right of privacy "creates a right of
action against private as well as government entities."172 Again,
using traditional methods of state constitutional interpretation, the
court relied first on the fact that the California Constitution contains an express right of privacy,173 and second on the arguments
165. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 387 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974».
166. See infra notes 168-81.
167. 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982); see also supra note 27.
168. See Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 598.
169. Id. at 598. The California provision states, "A person may not be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). By contrast, the federal provision declares, "Nor shall
any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
170. See Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 599.
171. Id. at 598-99.
172. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994).
173. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
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This Article does not contend that the Boy Scouts are engaging
in tactics similar to those used by the military to find and dismiss
homosexuals. It is nonetheless important to raise the point that if
the law allows BSA to exclude homosexuals, a possibility exists that
the BSA or its members will attempt to actively identify homosexuals and to use ways that may impact on the privacy rights of such
individuals. Dale's and Curran's statements revealing their homosexuality were both published in newspapers. 161 Chuck Merino,
founder and former leader of a Boy Scout Explorer Troop, however,
was dismissed by the Boy Scouts after he spoke at a community
meeting and revealed his homosexuality.162 One commentator noted, "How word of Merino's low-key comment got to the Scouting
hierarchy is unclear. But without so much as questioning him, the
Scouts sent a letter to Merino immediately banning him from any
role with the Explorers. "163 Consistent with the approach that
courts should consider a variety of sources in deciding how to interpret state constitutions, it is important for courts to understand the
potential impact of a decision involving the exclusion of homosexuals. This is especially true where permission to exclude may encourage infringements on individual privacy similar to the effect the
military's policy on gays has had. l64
C. State Action
The doctrine of state action provides a major hurdle to raising
state constitutional claims against BSA's exclusion of homosexuals

1999, at B6. In 1997, SLDN documented 563 violations of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy. See Andrew Sullivan, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy Showing Grim Results, Hous.
CHRON., Apr. 20, 1998, at Al9. SLDN also documented over 400 incidents of anti-gay harassment in 1998, an increase of 120% over the prior year. See Conduct Unbecoming,
supra note 157.
161. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 220-21; Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05.
162. Merino's story is recounted in Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 3, 101 n.274 (1995).
163. [d. (citing Tony Perry, Landmark Case Pits Gay Officer Against Boy Scouts,
LA TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A24).
164. A possible rejoinder to this statement is that courts should consider that a
prohibition on exclusion may discourage the beneficial activity of forming Boy Scout
groups. However, such an argument lacks any support, unlike the support provided by
the effect of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Analogously, the court's holding in
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting), reproduced in
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 20-24 (3d ed. 1993), did not discourage
people from hunting foxes as predicted by the dissent.
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contained in the ballot pamphlet of the election in which the
amendment was approved. 174 While the court held that the right
of privacy did not include a state action requirement, the court
nonetheless recognized and perpetuated the dichotomy, but determined that the unique aspects of the California Constitution dictated a different result as to privacy rights. 175
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that its
state constitution is not limited to federal precedent. 176 In New
Jersey v. Schmid,177 the court concluded that the state constitutional protection of free speech does not require "state action" such
that a private university could not prohibit the distribution of political leaflets on its grounds.178 Initially, the method of analysis
was typical. The court relied on the more expansive language in the
state constitution,179 and on the fact that this provision was modeled on other state constitutions, to determine that the state action
requirement was less restrictive than under the Federal Constitution. lSO However, the court in Schmid then set out a standard that
moved away from the customary binary analysis and instead set
out factors by which the court could balance the competing interests
of free speech and private property rights. lSl Thus, while the New
Among these [is] ... privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
174. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 648-49.
175. See id. at 656-57. The Texas Supreme Court employed a similar method of
analysis, but had a different result in Republican Party v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.
1997), where the court held that conduct by the Republican Party of Texas (RPT) did
not amount to state action. See id. at 92. Specifically, the court held that when RPT
denied the Log Cabin Republicans of Texas (LCR), who support equal rights for gay and
lesbian individuals, a booth at the Republican Convention, no constitutional violation occurred because the RPT is not a state actor. See id. at 92-93. The Texas Supreme Court
examined the text and history of the Texas Constitution, which protected only against
state actors. See id. at 91. The court further held that no state action was involved in
this case after considering federal precedent. See id. at 92. But see id. at 95 (Spector, J.,
concurring) (pointing out that the majority failed to recognize the reasons for the federal
state action requirement, namely the concerns "of federalism and separation of powers
within the federal government" and suggesting that those issues may not be present in
the context of a state constitutional protection).
176. See New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 629-30 (N.J. 1980).
177. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
178. See id. at 633.
179. Compare N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6 ("Every person may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."), with
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.").
180. See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 627-28.
181. See id. at 630. The considerations listed by the court are:
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Jersey court used a typical method of examining its constitution, it
sought to expound a theory of state action in the context of free
speech that avoided the traditional dichotomies.
The state action requirement in the context of a constitutional
challenge to the BSA's exclusion of homosexuals can work to give
the BSA an automatic advantage, even though such a case would
involve a clash of constitutional norms. 182 Where an individual
claims an equal protection or right of privacy violation, both of
which are constitutionally protected/83 and the BSA responds
with a constitutional defense of freedom of association, the traditionally narrow view of state action would likely result in a explicit
holding that no state actor has infringed on the individual's right to
equal protection or privacy, and an implicit finding that to hold
otherwise would impinge on the constitutional rights of BSA members, which would involve the state. That is, forcing BSA not to discriminate against homosexuals would violate its members' rights of
freedom of association, and no one would doubt that state action
was present. Yet this requirement is not present when the law
allows BSA to exclude such individuals. Thus, the doctrine of state
action fails to take into account any possibility that the state has
acted when it "render[s] one group triumphant. »184 My point in

(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally,
its 'normal' use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that
property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such
property in relation to both the private and public use of the property.
[d. The court applied this standard in an effort to "continue to explore the extent of our
State Constitutional right of free speech." New Jersey Coalition Against the War in the
Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 771 (N.J. 1994).
182. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2415.
183. However, Erwin Chemerinsky points out that "[iJn a sense, to speak of private
parties infringing constitutional rights begs the critical question of whether such rights
exist against private infringements." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 389 n.17.
Chemerinsky also comments in the text of his book: "The point here is that these are
values widely accepted as important throughout society and the state action doctrine
means that the Constitution does not limit their private infringement." [d.
184. Eskridge, supra note 9, at 2415 n.16 (discussing in the context of conflicts
between religious and gay groups, criticizing the approach that requires one group to
win while the other loses and suggesting that "courts can create structures and procedures of cooperation that are law-sustaining"); see also Julian N. Eule, as completed by
Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With
Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1545 (1998) ("[SJome form of
state action is nearly always present."); Harold W. Horowitz & Kenneth L. Karst,
Reitman v. Mulky: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39,
55 ("[T]he state can be said to authorize all conduct that it does not prohibit . . . .")j
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 445 ("Although the origin of state action is textual, counter-
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criticizing the state action requirement is not to advocate for its
abolition,l85 but rather to suggest that state courts might rely on
other sources to define the parameters of state action,186 in an effort to escape the "traditional, bipolar conceptualization"187 of the
public/private distinction. 18s Commentator John Devlin has proposed a theory for state constitutions that largely eschews the public/private dichotomy.189 Devlin's proposal carves out "zones of personal autonomy" that are to remain free from applications of constitutional guarantees. 190 This proposal would allow broader application of constitutional norms than the traditional state action requirement. However, even Devlin's proposal suffers from the defect
of creating another dichotomy. His proposal specifies that state
courts, in expanding the application of constitutional rights, should
limit such expansions "only [to] the most important and fundamental state constitutional rights," and further that courts should bind
private actors if rights "are violated in some important respect."191
While the second half of this limitation would have to be determined in the context of the facts of the case, the first aspect, focusing on fundamental rights, would require courts to establish a hierarchy of rights, which could well depend upon how the court defines the right. In Bowers, for example, the United States Supreme
Court simply framed the right as the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy to avoid a serious analysis of the privacy concerns invailing values of privacy, freedom of association, and free speech all have been used to
justify the rule's exculpation of private racism.").
185. See Eule, supra note 184, at 1544-45. As the title suggests, the author urges
caution regarding the emerging trend of imposing constitutional norms on private individuals and entities. See id. at 1537.
186. See Devlin, supra note 137, at 885-86 (proposing the following factors for an
alternative approach: that state constitutional rights be imposed on private actors only to
the extent such actors are "wielding impersonal power," that "only the most important
and fundamental state constitutional rights" be so imposed, and that state courts balance
the competing interests rather than view the plaintiffs rights "in a vacuum").
187. Myhra, supra note 5, at 80 n.39.
188. For additional criticisms of the public/private debate, see Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (describing state action
jurisprudence as a "conceptual disaster area"); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 209
(1957) (suggesting the futility of a meaningful distinction between private and state
action); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1351 (1982).
189. See Devlin, supra note 137, at 884.
190. [d. at 885.
191. [d.
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volved. 192 The third factor in Devlin's proposal involves a balancing of the competing rights. 193 This aspect of the proposal would
require courts to focus on the "underlying issue" involved in such
cases.194 Part IV of this Article suggests additional types of information state courts might consider when balancing the competing
rights.
Iv. CONCLUSION: SOURCES TO SUPPORT
DEPARTURES FROM THE TRADITIONAL DICHOTOMIES
The discussion in this Article has revolved around the notion
that independent interpretation of state constitutions offers an
opportunity for state courts to avoid the narrowing effect that traditional either/or choices have on analyses of competing claims. In
addition, this Article has suggested at several points that state
courts might give greater legitimacy to their new and fresh theories
by looking to so:urces beyond the different textual or historical aspects of their constitutions, or other examples of state uniqueness.
In the context of BSA's exclusion of homosexuals and the competing
claims involved, state courts should consider the developments in
the theory of "intergroup contact,"195 which suggests a possibility
for reducing prejudice. In addition, courts should generally consider
the unique concerns confronting homosexuals and gay youth in
particular.
Justice Handler's concurring opinion in Dale reflects refreshing
sensitivity to some of the issues specific to homosexuals. First, he
recognized the "confluence of status and expression when both relate to the speaker's sexual orientation."196 He cited law review
articles that argue when homosexuals "come out" they do more
than simply speak, they also reveal their identity.197 Justice Han-

192. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
193. See Devlin, supra note 137, at 886.
194. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 446 (referring to Frank Michelman, Conceptions of
DeTTUJcracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56
TENN. L. REv. 291, 306 (1989».
195. ALLPORT, supra note 13, at 281.
196. Dale, 734 A2d at 1238 (Handler, J., concurring); see also Eckols, supra note 11,
at 379-82 (discussing homosexual identity in the context of same-sex marriage).
197. See Dale, 734 A2d at 1238 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Brian C. Murchison,
Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 468 (1998) ("Selfrealization .. _ is what speech (including expressive activity) makes possible."); Nan D.
Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1718 (1993) ("Self-identifying speech does not merely reflect or communicate one's identity; it is a mlijor factor in
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dler even quoted the ACT UP slogan, "I am out, therefore I
am."198 In addition, Justice Handler considered social science
sources to dismiss, as based on groundless stereotypes, BSA's assertions that exclusion of homosexuals was consistent with its purpose
of encouraging the moral development of its members 199 and to
counter the myth that homosexuals are more likely to molest children.200 In addition to dismissing the stereotypes raised by BSA,
Justice Handler used these sources to bolster the New Jersey
Legislature's strong interest in prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.201
Because both James Dale and Timony Curran were young
adults when the BSA excluded them upon their "coming out," I urge
state courts to consider the following issues confronting gay youth.
Gay youth represent about 28% of the dropout rate in public
schools.202 About one-third of the nearly 5000 annual suicides by
adolescents are committed by young gays and lesbians.203 In one
study, 40% of the 221 gay youth questioned reported having attempted suicide at least once.204 Attempts to account for these statistics suggest that "societal condemnation of homosexuality [means
that] growing up gay or lesbian often has a negative impact on
one's psychological development. [M]any gay and lesbian youth ...
experience adolescence characterized by isolation, fear, and emotional distress."205 In fact, it was at a conference at Rutgers Uniconstructing identity."».
198. Id.
199. See id. at 1242 (citing Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A
Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133, 134 (1991) (relying on
social science data to debunk "longstanding cultural myths and stereotypes that depict
lesbians and gay men as immoral, criminal, sick, and drastically different from what
most members of society would consider 'normalm ».
200. See id. at 1243 (citing Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual
Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 44 (1994) (stating that most child abusers are
heterosexuals); David Newton, Homosexual Behavior and Child Molestation: A Review of
the Evidence, 13 ADOLESCENCE 29 (1978».
201. See id. at 1239.
202. See Armstrong, supra note 8, at 77.
203. See id. at 75 (citing Andrew Kurtzman, Gay Teens Harassed in New York
Schools: Advocates Say Homophobia Is the Last Form of Intolerance Allowed to Flourish,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 5, 1992, at D6); Scott L. Hershberger et al., Predictors of
Suicide Attempts Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth, 12 J. ADOLESCENT REs. 477,
477 (1997).
204. See Hershberger et al., supra note 203, at 481, 492.
205. Arnold H. Grossman & Matthew S. Kerner, Self-Esteem and Supportiveness as
Predictors of Emotional Distress in Gay Male and Lesbian Youth, 35 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
25, 35 (1998); see also Ken Corbett, Cross-Gendered Identifications and Homosexual
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versity addressing "the unique problems faced by homosexual teenagers struggling to come to terms with their sexual orientation, including an alarmingly high incidence of suicide attempts," that
James Dale spoke of his own experiences as a gay youth. 206 The
leading stressors accounting for these statistics have been identified
as the "awareness of [homosexual youth of] their homoerotic attractions," the "disclosure of [their] sexual orientation" to others, especially where they have experienced rejection following such disclosure, and the "victimization provoked by their sexual orientation."207 Thus, homosexual youth, overall, are in great distress. A
critical aspect of this distress may be the extent to which homosexual teenagers are supported, or at least not excluded, by those
groups or individuals whom the teenager considers important to his
or her life.20B Courts considering whether to allow an entity like
BSA to exclude homosexuals should take into account the findings
of studies such as these,209 much the same way the Supreme
Boyhood: Toward a More Complex Theory of Gender, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 352,
353 (1998) (describing the developmental problems boys may face due to the traditional
fixed definition of gender by noting that "boys are made anxious when characterized as
feminine, or when they feel themselves to be outside the bounds of traditional masculini·
ty").

206. Dale, 734 A2d at 1239 n.4 (Handler, J., concurring). From this conference an
interview with Dale was published in a newspaper that made its way to BSA authori·
ties. See id.
207. Hershberger et al., supra note 203, at 479-80. 17% of the 221 homosexual
youths questioned reported that they had been physically assaulted and 80% had been
the victims of verbal insults. See id. at 480--81.
208. While the Grossman & Kerner study indicates that supportiveness can be con·
sidered an unimportant factor, the authors call for further research on this issue, with
specific focus on the "type of support, e.g., emotional, social, and from designated people,
e.g., parents, friends, [and] teachers." Grossman & Kerner, supra note 205, at 37.
209. Somewhat ironically, it seems that the Boy Scout philosophy embodied in the
Scout Oath and Law helped to equip James Dale with the resilience necessary to
overcome the struggles listed above. He stated,
I believed that the Scout Oath stood for my commitment to live an honorable
life, to set high standards for myself, and to do my best to serve others. In my
more than twelve years as a member of BSA, I strove never to do anything
inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath . . . . As I grew . . .
older, my commitment to Scouting deepened. Scouting . . . taught me how to
deal with the ethical choices I encountered as a teenager.
Dale, 734 A2d at 1226-27; see also David Rakoff, The Way We Live Now: 8·22·99; Ques·
tions for James Dale: Camping Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at
17 (Dale stated: "I was always picked on a lot in school, but the Boy Scouts was a
community that accepted me, welcomed me, gave me positive reinforcement.");
Szymanski, supra note 160, at B·11. In discussing her decision to resign from the Navy
due to her sexual orientation, the author states, "I held the Navy's Core Values of hon·
or, courage and commitment dear to my heart - and still do. The Navy taught me that
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Court examined the impact of segregated education in Brown v.
Board of Education. 21o
In addition to the issues facing homosexual youth, state courts
should also consult studies regarding the theory of "intergroup contact."211 Subsequent studies have summarized Allport's theory as
a prediction that intergroup contact will "lead to reduced intergroup
prejudice if... the contact situation meets four conditions:
(1) equal status between the groups in the situation, (2) common
goals [among those in the group], (3) no competition between
groups, and (4) authority sanction for the contact."212 The basic
idea is that if individuals from different racial groups interact within the above parameters, prejudice will be reduced, both within the
contact group as well as with other people the individuals come into
contact with later on. While a number of studies conclude that
Allport's theory is not supported by sufficient empirical evidence,213 others suggest that these studies are faulty.214 However, certain types of intergroup contact provide significant support
for the theory.215 Additional studies also indicate support for the
theory, with some refinements,216 especially where sexual orientation differences displace racial differences. 217 Herek and Capitano

courage that gives us the moral and mental strength to do what is right, even in the
face of adversity." Id.
210. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
211. Originally espoused by Gordon W. Allport, in his book THE NATURE OF PREJuDICE, supra note 13, at 281.
212. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 173, 173 (1997); see also Thomas F. Pettigrew,
Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 65, 66-67 (1998) [hereinafter
Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory] (elaborating on each of the four requirements);
Christopher B. Smith, Back to the Future: The Intergroup Contact Hypothesis Revisited,
64 SOC. INQUIRY 438, 438 (1994) (discussing the four requirements set forth by Allport).
213. See Donna M. Desforges et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on
Changing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531-32 (1991) (citing studies indicating how narrow the parameters
of Allport's theory are); Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Manuel Barajas, Intimate Social Contact, Cultural Proximity, and Prejudice Toward Mexican-Origin Persons: A Modified
Application of Contact Theory 4-5 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Stetson Law Review) (citing studies that show that contact does not overcome prejudice
based on status differences).
214. See Smith, supra note 212, at 440-42.
215. See Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, supra note 212, at 67-68 (citing, for
example, studies of the Merchant Marines after desegregation and studies comparing
desegregated public housing with segregated public housing).
216. See Smith, supra note 212, at 453.
217. See Herek & Capitanio, supra note 13, at 422.
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concluded that "[h]eterosexuals who had experienced interpersonal
contact with gay men or lesbians expressed significantly more favorable general attitudes toward gay people than heterosexuals
without contact."218 They surmise that the results of their study,
compared to results of studies of interracial contact, indicate more
positive attitudes due to the fact that homosexuality is often a concealable stigma. 219 The significance of the concealable stigma
means that a heterosexual who is friends with a homosexual has
probably "directly discussed homosexuality. .. and consequently
has acquired greater insight and empathy for their situation. ,,220
By contrast, "a White person can have a Black friend but never
discuss issues related to race in any depth . . . . [Thus, the White
person] might still retain negative stereotypes and attitudes toward
African Americans as a group. ,,221 Apart from the likelihood that
the heterosexual will discuss homosexuality with the gay friend
(after all, Boy Scouts are not to discuss within their groups any
issues relating to sex) the fact that the stigma is concealed means
that the homosexual "is evaluated on the basis of factors apart from
her or his stigmatized status."222 Essentially, this indicates that if
prejudice and intolerance are based, in large part, on ignorance and
fear/ 23 where otherwise intolerant, or less tolerant, people get to
know a member of a stigmatized group in a context where the stigma does not create barriers,224 upon learning of the stigma, such
individuals are likely to reevaluate their prior attitudes about, in
this case, homosexuals. Thus, while the social science evidence
regarding the accuracy of the intergroup contact theory may be

218. Id. at 420.
219. See id. at 422.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 412. The concealable status factor may also address another criticism of
Allport's theory. One parameter is that equal status exists within the context of the
intergroup contact; however, some commentators have argued that this is impossible
with a situation where is no equal status. See Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory,
supra note 212, at 66. If the stigma is concealable, there is a greater likelihood that the
individuals in the group situation are equal both coming into and within the situation.
223. See supra notes 8, 10.
224. See Herek & Capitanio, supra note 13, at 412.
When majority group members interact with someone who has a readily apparent stigma, they are likely from the outset to encode information about that
person in terms of her or his minority status. Their preexisting attitudes and
beliefs about the stigmatized group are likely to influence their evaluations of
the individual exemplar. . . .
Id.
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inconclusive when the stigma is race, the fact that homosexuals can
conceal their identity demonstrates that where heterosexuals have
close contact with homosexuals who are "passing"225 and the other
parameters of Allport's prediction are present, such contact results
in significantly positive attitudes about homosexuals, as compared
to the attitudes of heterosexuals who have not had such contact.
Such consideration can aid state courts in their efforts to give
meaning to their state's constitutional provisions, beyond an examination of only the text, history or other unique factors, as Paul
Kahn urges. 226 It is interesting that Justice Handler first specifically articulated the unique factors a state court should consider in
interpreting its state constitution,227 and his opinion in Dale
serves as a prime example, in this Article, of the relevance and
importance of courts looking to a variety of sources when resolving
these types of conflicts. My proposal is simply that state courts put
this idea together with the objective of abandoning the traditional
dichotomies and replacing them with a balancing that considers the
potential impact of the result as well as the significance of the
interests at stake which do not fit into one of the traditional either/or categories. Study of such opposites only serves to stifle and
narrow analysis rather than to advance it.

225. However, concealing one's sexual orientation is not without its costs. James
Dale stated that "he lived a double life, while in high school, pretending to be straight
while attending military academy ... [and he looked for] a community that would take
him in and provide him with a support network and friends." Dale, 734 A.2d at 1239-40
(Handler, J., concurring); see also Robert Lisyte, A Major League Player's Life of Isolation and Subterfuge, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1999, at D9 (describing how Billy Bean's
efforts to conceal his homosexuality resulted in "a great deal of guilt and self-hate").
226. See supra note 28.
227. See supra note 27.

